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Scenario for Further Consultations
and Opening NPT for Signature

In addition to the consultations which have been undertaken with the UK, Canada, Italy, the FRG and Japan, we are now committed to initiate consultations with all NATO governments on or about January 20, with a formal exchange of views starting in NAC on February 1. During the NAC discussion a private effort should be made to ascertain whether France has any interest in becoming an original nuclear weapon state signatory of the treaty.

It is our hope that the NAC consultations will lead to a favorable consensus, at least on the main elements of the treaty, as early as possible in February. This would permit us to resume discussions with the Soviets by mid-February (the ENDC Co-Chairmen are scheduled to meet on February 16 in Geneva) with a view to reaching agreement on the complete text of a draft treaty by the time the ENDC is scheduled to resume on February 21.

SAFEGUARDS

One complicating factor in maintaining the above schedule

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is the absence of a safeguards article in the draft text on which we are now consulting our allies. Although it would be possible to proceed with the NAC consultations and even to resume US-Soviet talks before we have resolved the question of a safeguards article, every reasonable effort should be made to achieve agreement on this article in time to have it appear in the text which is placed before the ENDC.

The longer the appearance of such an article is delayed, the greater will be the pressure to avoid complicating the negotiation of the treaty with this admittedly difficult issue.

Once we have established a definite US negotiating position on this article, therefore, we should convey it first to the EURATOM governments and then promptly inform NAC so that, following an initial exchange of views with EURATOM members, we can complete the NAC consultation as soon as possible.

CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS

We must also consider initiating consultations with other governments whose adherence to the NPT is critical. The fact that we have been in consultation with certain of our allies is already publicly known and we can expect increasing pressure from non-NATO countries for information on the status

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of negotiations(e.g. we have already been approached by Australia, India and Sweden).

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It would be preferable if consultations with other governments could be delayed until an agreed US-Soviet text had been tabled at the ENDC. An agreed US-Soviet draft would increase our negotiating leverage and minimize delay in concluding a treaty. India and Sweden are special cases. Whether or not they formally ask to be consulted before a treaty is tabled at the ENDC, it would be advisable to make at least a general approach to them before they receive an agreed US-Soviet text at the ENDC. This might be done in terms of a general summary of the treaty (no text) at the time we resume talks with the Soviets. Every effort should be made to give them a copy of the agreed US-Soviet text somewhat in advance of its circulation to the ENDC. Given anticipated Indian resistance to certain provisions and expected demands by both India and Sweden for the inclusion of additional provisions looking toward reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, however, we should avoid being drawn into detailed consultations with them on actual treaty language until we have reached agreement with the Soviets.

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Once we have reached agreement with the Soviets, moreover, we should make a special point of consulting key countries not members of ENDC or NATO (e.g. Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, Australia, etc.). We should be prepared during the ENDC session to explain the draft treaty to any government which displays a special interest. We should also arrange with the Soviets to pass copies of the text to all governments once it had been tabled at the ENDC.

Australia constitutes another special case. In view of our close political-military ties, together with the fact that we anticipate no strong objections from that country, we should respond favorably to an Australian request for consultation on the treaty. This could be done concurrently with our consultations in NAC.

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

7 The Soviets have suggested completing the negotiation of the treaty at the level of Foreign Ministers. They have talked in terms of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the nuclear powers to complete the draft of a treaty and have also suggested that the ENDC should meet at the level of foreign ministers to consider the draft and presumably to

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16th date

sign the final text.

? An ENDC meeting at the level of foreign ministers is desirable as a means of expediting agreement among the ENDC countries on the proposed treaty. While foreign ministers would probably not be able to remain for the entire session, their presence during the first week or two would serve to highlight the importance of the discussion and to cut through what might otherwise prove to be a wasteful period of initial bargaining on positions involving matters of minor importance. We should accordingly favor opening the ENDC session at the level of foreign ministers. This would involve an invitation from the US and Soviet Co-Chairmen to the other foreign ministers concerned and might require a short postponement of the February 21 scheduled date for reconvening ENDC to allow time for the ministers to come to Geneva.

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concludes*

More troublesome is the Soviet suggestion that the foreign ministers of the nuclear powers should meet in advance of the ENDC session to reach agreement on a draft treaty. This Soviet suggestion appears to be linked with the hope that France might agree to become an original nuclear signatory, a prospect which now appears rather unlikely. It is possible

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that the Soviets also intended to issue a pro forma invitation to the Chinese Communists, but they made no mention of this.

Whether the Soviets would continue to favor a prior meeting of foreign ministers of the nuclear powers if France is unwilling to participate is open to question. In any event such a meeting would serve little purpose if it were also agreed to convene ENDC at the level of foreign ministers. While it would enable the UK to display its interest in the treaty, a matter of considerable domestic political importance to the UK Government, such a meeting would undesirably highlight the role of the nuclear powers in preparing a treaty which non-nuclear states are expected to accept. On balance such a prior meeting would appear to have more disadvantages than advantages and we should seek to head it off if it is still desired by the Soviets.

The ostensible Soviet objective of wanting to use such a meeting to stress the importance of an agreed US-Soviet draft could be achieved as well by having the two Governments, acting as ENDC co-chairmen, announce that they have reached agreement and jointly invite the foreign ministers of ENDC

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*Do not
transmit*

countries to attend the session. The draft text should be sent to ENDC capitals in advance of the opening of the session and made public when the ENDC convenes. At that point it should also be transmitted to all other governments, with such appropriate interpretive commentaries as each side desires to provide to particular governments.

To meet the anticipated desire of the UK to appear in a special role in conjunction with the achievement of an agreed US-Soviet draft, Lord Chalfont might be asked to join the Co-Chairmen in Geneva just before the US-Soviet agreement is announced.

*With
draft sent to
FRG,
for
+?
France?*

OPENING NPT FOR SIGNATURE

Assuming that an essential degree of agreement is achieved during the ENDC session (i.e. sufficient consensus to offer substantial promise of eventual Indian, Swedish and Japanese adherence), the final text might be initialled by the ENDC participants. Formal signature should take place in the capitals of the depositary governments. This would enable us to manage the GDR signature in accordance with the precedents established by the Limited Test Ban and Outer Space treaties and avoid the risk of a GDR representative

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presenting himself in Geneva to sign the treaty there. In keeping with our desire to minimize the appearance of a fait accompli, the above procedure rules out any signature of the treaty by the US and USSR or other nuclear weapon states prior to its being formally opened for signature in the depositary capitals.

Every effort should be made to avoid subjecting the draft treaty to a further round of discussion following what we hope will be a conclusive discussion at the ENDC. This means that a major effort will be required to consult non-ENDC countries in such detail as they may desire concurrently with the ENDC discussion. This is known to accord with Soviet views and their cooperation in such general consultations should be secured. The possibility of convening the UN Disarmament Commission for further discussion of a draft treaty is always available, but should be discouraged firmly if suggested by others during the ENDC session.

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